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Introduction 
 
 
Ukraine in Crisis 
Challenges of Developing a New Political Culture 
Steffen Halling and Susan Stewart 
Ukraine is currently experiencing its worst crisis since obtaining independence 
in 1991. Violent escalation in Kyiv costing dozens of lives, separatist endeavours in 
Crimea and instability in the eastern provinces result not only from Russia’s irre-
sponsible great-power politics, but also from an elite prioritising its own self-interest. 
Viktor Yanukovych’s corrupt and increasingly authoritarian regime was merely the 
most extreme expression yet of a political culture dedicated to serving special interests 
with no heed to good governance. With popular hopes of meaningful political change 
already dashed once after the Orange Revolution, how Ukrainian politicians handle 
their power now and in the future will be absolutely crucial. 
 
In view of the broad economic and security-
related implications of the Crimea crisis 
for the post-Soviet states and the European 
Union, it is easy to lose sight of domestic 
political developments in Ukraine. While 
the Ukrainian government can plausibly 
claim that other concerns must take a back 
seat for the moment, the ruling elite is in 
fact already establishing particular forms 
of power. Both Brussels and Ukrainian civil 
society actors should follow domestic devel-
opments very carefully in order to prevent 
a continuation of harmful patterns dating 
back at least to the presidency of Leonid 
Kuchma (1994–2005). 
The key to a genuine new beginning in 
Ukraine lies with its political elites, who 
must fundamentally change their attitudes 
to both power and society. The circum-
stances also represent an essentially dif-
ferent challenge to external actors than 
would the case of a disagreement over the 
specifics of planned reforms. In Ukraine a 
substantive dimension has yet to be intro-
duced into politics. To date politics has 
been shaped more by intrigues and special 
interests than by genuine debate about 
different societal models or the potential 
consequences of signing the Association 
Agreement with the EU. 
In many respects Ukraine is still stuck 
where it was at the beginning of the trans-
formation phase in 1991. In some ways the 
situation has even worsened. This is true 
not only for the quality of political actors, 
but also for the efficiency and relevance of 
the still Soviet-style bureaucracy. Whenever 
fundamental political choices have had 
to be made, such as drafting or amending 
the constitution or electoral legislation, the 
 Steffen Halling is Project Associate in SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division SWP Comments 18 
 Dr. Susan Stewart is Deputy Head of SWP’s Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division April 2014 
1 
 elite has generally served the short-term 
political needs of individuals or small 
groups and paid scant attention to the 
country’s long-term interests or to develop-
ing an understanding of the public good. 
Laws have been manipulated or selectively 
applied in order to satisfy special interests 
and shut out opposition figures. Instead of 
gradually improving the efficiency and pro-
fessionalism of administrative structures, 
they have been abused for private ends. 
This is why it is now vital to establish a 
culture in parliament (and elsewhere) that 
facilitates and fosters substantive debate. 
Its purpose must be to prepare and initiate 
public-minded reforms in core areas. The 
government needs to demonstrate its wil-
lingness to seek compromise and operate 
inclusively. Given that this would represent 
a rupture with their previous socialisation 
and experience, it will be an enormous 
challenge for Ukrainian politicians. The 
current elite is under pressure to make 
hasty decisions, on which the international 
community also insists. But in the present 
phase the process counts for as much as 
the outcome. In the past, severely defective 
decision-making processes often had deci-
sive and negative repercussions on out-
comes. That applies both to law-making and 
to executive decision-making. If the new 
leaders fail to eliminate these deficits in the 
first phase of their rule, there is a danger 
that they will revert to the old problematic 
behaviour patterns. 
Domestic Political Developments in 
the Post-Yanukovych Phase 
When Viktor Yanukovych fled from office 
at the end of February 2014, the Ukrainian 
parliament had no option but to respond 
rapidly. After Yanukovych failed to keep 
the promises made in the agreement nego-
tiated with the participation of three EU 
foreign ministers on 21 February 2014, op-
position leaders felt released from any obli-
gations they had undertaken in the same 
context. Instead of the “government of 
national unity” laid down in the agreement, 
only the Fatherland Party and Svoboda 
were represented in the new cabinet (along-
side a number of unaffiliated ministers). 
The composition of the government is 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, Vitali 
Klitschko’s Ukrainian Democratic Alliance 
for Reform (UDAR) is not on board, suggest-
ing a growing rift between UDAR and the 
Fatherland Party. This rift has been further 
manifested by Klitschko’s decision to with-
draw from the presidential race and give 
his support to Petro Poroshenko (see below, 
p. 3). It also reflects a fundamental weak-
ness of UDAR, which is not well-established 
in the regions and apart from Klitschko has 
no well-known figures who could have filled 
significant cabinet posts. Parliamentary co-
operation between the former opposition 
parties is thus already crumbling. 
Secondly, and much more problematic 
with respect to establishing a new more 
inclusive political culture, the government 
includes virtually no representative figures 
with whom the mass of citizens in the east-
ern and southern regions could identify. 
Presenting the nominated ministers to the 
Maidan before the vote in parliament repre-
sented a strong message to the east and 
south that the interests of those who failed 
to accept the Maidan movement were going 
to be ignored. Three ministers come direct-
ly from the ranks of that movement: Oleh 
Musiy for health, Yevhen Nyshchuk for cul-
ture, and Dmytro Bulatov for youth and 
sport, whereby the latter two undeniably 
lack political experience and expertise. 
Furthermore, the right-wing nationalist 
Svoboda initially supplied three ministers, 
for defence, agriculture and ecology, as well 
as one of the three deputy prime ministers. 
(The defence minister, Ihor Teniukh, has 
since been replaced by Mykhailo Koval, who 
has no party affiliation.) Svoboda was able 
to capitalise on good results in the 2012 
parliamentary elections and its presence on 
the Maidan. However, its electoral success 
stemmed largely from its ability to mobilise 
a protest vote that was equally dissatisfied 
with the government and the opposition. 
Since entering parliament Svoboda’s popu-
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 larity has fallen steadily. Even its leader 
and presidential hopeful Oleh Tyahnybok 
currently enjoys only very weak support 
(between 1 and 3 percent depending on the 
poll consulted). Right-wing extremists and 
ethno-nationalist currents are almost in-
discernible in Ukrainian society. 
It remains unclear why the government 
calls itself “transitional” and how long it 
will actually remain in office. After the re-
instatement of the constitution of 2004, a 
new government will not automatically have 
to be formed following the presidential elec-
tion planned for 25 May, although this may 
in fact occur. And while early parliamen-
tary elections have been discussed, no deci-
sion about holding them has been taken. 
A total of 23 candidates have now de-
clared their intention to run. According 
to the latest polls Poroshenko, an oligarch 
who publicly supported the Maidan pro-
tests (and is known as the “chocolate king” 
for his confectionery empire) has the most 
support, followed by Yulia Tymoshenko, 
leader of the Fatherland Party, and Serhiy 
Tyhypko, who in recent years has led a 
moderate section of the Party of Regions 
focused on economic issues. He is running 
independently as a result of the decision of 
the Party of Regions to nominate Mykhailo 
Dobkin, former governor of the Kharkiv 
region, as its presidential candidate. Current-
ly Tymoshenko and Tyhypko are battling 
for second place in the polls, while Dobkin 
has only low support. Much can change 
before the election date, but currently most 
observers believe the main contest will be 
between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko. The 
central government faces an uphill struggle 
to guarantee sufficient stability for properly 
conducted elections in all the regions (with 
the exception of Crimea, which is already 
beyond its control). Although Ukraine has 
already acquired a great deal of experience 
in holding elections, and Ukrainian civil 
society is well-equipped for the tasks of 
election monitoring, the new Central Elec-
tion Commission is still inexperienced and 
past OSCE reports suggest that certain 
aspects of the electoral law are problematic, 
e.g. the composition of local election com-
missions. 
A free and fair election would be an im-
portant sign that the political culture is 
changing, and leaving behind the Yanu-
kovych era in which elections were increas-
ingly manipulated. However, the first acts 
of the Ukrainian parliament after the over-
throw were not auspicious. During the 
process of deposing Yanukovych, the con-
stitutional impeachment process was 
grossly abridged. Leading representatives of 
Ukrainian civil society have already flagged 
other violations of parliamentary proce-
dure, such as the dismissal of serving judges 
by parliament. A recently passed law on 
lustration proceedings for judges has been 
criticised by human rights organisations 
for being overly broad in its reasons for 
allowing lustration and thereby opening 
to the door to politically biased decisions. 
The government is also in the process of 
resuming old patterns of behaviour. Repre-
sentatives of the Yanukovych regime have 
been summoned for questioning by the 
prosecutor general, and some detained, 
apparently for political reasons. One of 
these is Mykhailo Dobkin. However, he has 
not been prevented from running for presi-
dent. His close confidant Hennadyj Kernes, 
the mayor of Kharkiv, is kept under house 
arrest at night but allowed to carry out his 
mayoral duties during the day. More troubl-
ing is an incident in which three members 
of the Svoboda Party used violence to force 
the head of the national television super-
visory body to resign, supposedly for allow-
ing pro-Russian material to be broadcast 
(see also below). How the General Prosecu-
tor (also a member of Svoboda) deals with 
the investigation will be a test of whether 
both the procuracy and the Svoboda Party 
are able to handle conflicts in a profession-
al manner. 
The Role of the Oligarchs in the 
New Power Structure 
A symbiotic relationship between economy 
and politics characterises Ukrainian politi-
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 cal culture, which is largely shaped by 
special interests. Under conditions of wide-
spread corruption and inadequate rule 
of law, the reciprocal interdependence 
of economy and politics is regulated by 
patron-client relationships. A particular 
role here falls to the oligarchs, whose 
relevance has both political and economic 
implications that must be factored into 
the equation. 
Oligarchs are businesspeople whose 
great wealth permits them to exert in-
fluence on the political system and its 
decision-making processes to further their 
own advantage. As a rule this occurs infor-
mally, for example through control of 
groups of parliamentarians and by funding 
political parties. But control of the mass 
media (which become particularly relevant 
at election time) is also an integral com-
ponent of the oligarchs’ power resources. 
Although the oligarchs do contribute to 
the political process by influencing differ-
ent camps, they simultaneously erode the 
transparency of decision-making procedures 
and manipulate democratic institutions. 
The oligarchs have succeeded in estab-
lishing monopoly structures and bringing 
entire production chains under their con-
trol to achieve higher profits than they 
would under conditions of fair competi-
tion. Alongside their influence on the po-
litical and legal environment, their privi-
leged access to state resources has also 
proven especially lucrative in relation to 
privatisations and public procurement. 
Because the oligarchs prioritise short-term 
profits over long-term modernisation, past 
reform processes advanced only to the 
extent that they matched their interests. 
In this context it is especially difficult for 
small and medium-sized enterprises to 
operate profitably. By influencing the deci-
sive underlying conditions for business 
activity, the oligarchs also have an impact 
on Ukraine’s attractiveness to investors. 
Most of the oligarchs backed Yanukovych 
to the end and supported his authoritarian 
and repressive leadership style. That was 
clearly evident in the voting behaviour of 
the parliamentarians they controlled and 
in media reporting. At the same time, the 
events of past weeks also demonstrate that 
the oligarchs’ political allegiances are fluid. 
In fact, the collapse of Yanukovych’s inter-
nal power base can also be attributed to 
the defection of individual oligarchs. But 
fading loyalty to one regime did not mean 
that they were willing to renounce their 
political influence. Instead their political 
positioning is guided by cost-benefit cal-
culations. One core question concerning 
future developments is thus how the rela-
tionship between the political and eco-
nomic elites will evolve. 
The new government’s immense de-
pendence on the loyalty of the oligarchs, 
especially in the eastern parts of the coun-
try where it possesses precious little influ-
ence, was revealed immediately after it 
took office. In order to calm the situation 
and rebuff external destabilisation moves, 
two oligarchs were entrusted with the gov-
ernorships of Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk. 
Ihor Kolomojs’kyj and Serhij Taruta were 
recruited on the basis that securing terri-
torial integrity and national unity lay in 
the interests of both sides. But this depend-
ence on the oligarchs undermines the 
freedom of choice and credibility of the 
political leadership and obstructs the 
fundamental transformation of the politi-
cal system. Nonetheless, and despite great 
scepticism, in the current crisis situation 
the population appears to tolerate the 
direct inclusion of oligarchs in matters of 
government. 
The Ruling Elite and 
Regional Differences 
Developments in Crimea have shown 
Ukrainians and outside actors just how 
salient regional differences can become. 
One reason the situation was able to esca-
late so rapidly was because Ukrainian 
politicians have spent the past 23 years 
playing up regional differences for the sake 
of electoral advantage, and have failed to 
work towards an overarching Ukrainian 
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 identity. Although more than two decades 
of living in a shared state have engendered 
a certain form of common identity, there 
is still a vast gap between foreign policy 
orientations in the eastern and western 
regions. Of course east and west are both 
internally heterogeneous, and the conven-
ient east-west scheme also neglects the cen-
tral regions, which occupy an intermediate 
position both in linguistic/cultural terms 
and with respect to foreign policy attitudes. 
The events in Crimea not only underline 
Vladimir Putin’s determination to hold 
onto levers of influence in Ukraine, which 
leads him to seek to destabilise the new 
government in Kyiv at any price. They also 
make it abundantly clear that Ukrainian 
politicians have made woefully inadequate 
efforts to foster national cohesion and are 
now paying the price for their failure. It 
was thus possible to inspire many inhabi-
tants of Crimea with the prospect of a 
closer relationship with Moscow, and even 
that of annexation to Russia. 
Thus one of the foremost priorities of 
the new Ukrainian government must be 
to convince the population in the east and 
south of the country that it also represents 
their interests. That would be a step on 
the road to a political culture in which wil-
lingness to communicate and to compro-
mise plays an important role. Now that the 
Russian occupation has made the situation 
in Crimea too unstable, such attempts 
should be directed instead in particular 
towards the eastern regions bordering Rus-
sia. They differ significantly from Crimea: 
Firstly, they are more Ukrainian in both 
linguistic and cultural respects. Secondly, 
they have no significant tradition of sup-
port for independence or accession to 
Russia (although the majority do desire 
close relations with Russia, including join-
ing its customs union with Belarus and 
Kazakhstan). Such preferences are certainly 
instrumentalised by Russia, by Russian 
media and in direct intervention by Russian 
activists on the ground, as the recent occu-
pation of governmental buildings in Kharkiv, 
Donetsk and Luhansk demonstrates. 
However, many Ukrainian politicians 
appear oblivious to the need for persuasion 
in the eastern regions. Not only, as already 
outlined, is the new government less than 
inclusive, but one of the very first decisions 
by parliament after the overthrow of Yanu-
kovych was to revoke an amendment to the 
language law recognising Russian (and the 
languages of other ethnic minorities) as 
an official language at the regional level. 
Although Acting President Oleksandr 
Turchynov declined to sign the measure, 
the vote itself had already sent a negative 
message to the numerous Russian-speaking 
inhabitants of the east and south. On 5 
March 2014 the national parliament regis-
tered a draft law on accession to NATO. 
Such a law would strongly polarise the 
country, where attitudes to NATO are dia-
metrically opposed in east and west. These 
and other proposals (such as banning tele-
vision channels broadcast from Russia or 
temporarily closing the border to Russia) 
only heighten the mistrust of those who 
feel excluded by the new rulers and feed 
resentments that Russia can exploit to 
mobilise parts of the population for its own 
ends. This in turn increases the likelihood 
of a creeping Russian intervention in the 
eastern provinces. 
Channelling Civil Society Protest 
The protests that erupted in Kyiv at the end 
of November 2013 demonstrated the impor-
tance and influence of Ukrainian civil soci-
ety. The protest movement still remains 
present with its general demands for rule of 
law, transparency and democracy. After the 
removal of the Yanukovych regime, it seeks 
above all lasting change in the country’s 
dominant political culture. 
The general level of protest potential 
within society and the capacity to mobilise 
opposition groups – both characteristic of 
the country’s pluralism – already distin-
guished Ukraine from other countries in 
the region. But the Maidan protest move-
ment stands out from the classical post-
Soviet electoral revolutions of the kind 
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 Ukraine itself experienced almost ten years 
earlier in the course of the Orange Revo-
lution. The “Euromaidan” movement ini-
tiated by students and intellectuals origi-
nally sought a specific change in govern-
ment foreign policy: the signing of the EU-
Ukraine Association Agreement, which had 
come to be seen as a symbol of modernisa-
tion and progress. It only gradually turned 
into a resistance movement against the 
Yanukovych regime after the state security 
organs attempted to violently suppress it. 
In the end the movement even reached 
the eastern and southern regions, with the 
effect of fostering both national cohesion 
and the emergence of a civic, i.e. politically 
based identity. Both the concrete demands 
of the protesters and the instruments 
deployed to achieve them generated their 
own momentum: The protests grew mas-
sively in response to intensifying state 
repression, while their trajectory also 
reflected the heterogeneity of the move-
ment. 
From the outset the established opposi-
tion parties Fatherland, UDAR and Svoboda 
found it difficult to dispel the protesters’ 
mistrust and gain a foothold on the Maidan. 
Fractures in the interdependent relation-
ship between parliamentary opposition and 
civil society were exposed whenever con-
crete decisions about actions to be taken 
needed to be made. Regular public meet-
ings (veche councils) served as venues 
for forming opinion and legitimised the 
activities of the opposition leadership. 
The newly founded Maidan People’s Union 
brings together established politicians 
and activists and represents a formalised 
attempt to find a binding framework for 
the heterogeneity of the protest movement 
and lend it influence and representation. 
Maidan representatives who gained popu-
larity in the course of the protests were also 
included in the new government, partially 
as a response to the pressure of “the street”. 
The establishment of a national guard in-
tegrating members of the self-defence units 
that emerged in the course of the protests 
can also be understood as an attempt to 
take the significance of the protest move-
ment into account and concede greater 
influence and responsibility to civil society. 
But both forms of direct participation in 
executive power structures by the Maidan 
movement are also associated with prob-
lems of legitimacy. 
The Maidan phenomenon has tempo-
rarily eclipsed the classical distinction 
between parliamentary opposition and 
government in Ukraine’s competitive 
authoritarian political system. The political 
landscape has become foggier. The protest 
movement’s demand for a “reboot” of the 
political system with lustration to guaran-
tee the integrity of the political leader-
ship will maintain grassroots pressure on 
the ruling elite and contains potential for 
further protests. This potential is already 
being realised to some extent, for example 
when parts of the Maidan movement 
demanded a criminal investigation against 
a Svoboda deputy who took the law into his 
own hands and forced the head of the state 
television supervisory body to write a letter 
of resignation. The key question concerns 
the future relationship between civil soci-
ety and the elite. There is a need to clarify 
how greater and more effective civil society 
participation can be ensured, and whether 
the elite in fact desire such participation at 
all. In all events, achieving more transpar-
ency will be decisive. 
Options for Germany and the 
European Union 
Supporting Ukraine presents external 
actors with a dilemma. On the one hand, 
Ukraine’s economy is heading for collapse 
and requires immediate assistance. And 
the Crimea crisis has created a series of 
additional problems, not all of which the 
European Union is in a position to respond 
to. On the other hand, there is a consider-
able danger that the new Ukrainian leader-
ship could revert to old habits. The flood of 
support it has received could easily give the 
ruling elite the impression that the West 
places virtually no conditions on the assis-
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 tance provided, or that the danger pres-
ented by Russia’s intervention divests it 
of the necessity to observe any such con-
ditions. How can the European Union and 
Germany stabilise Ukraine economically 
and at the same time persuade the Ukrain-
ian elite to improve its governance? 
The developments described above show 
that a reversion to the previous political 
culture in Ukraine is all too likely. Some 
indicators already point in that direction, 
but it is still too early to speak of a stable 
trend. Germany and the European Union 
have many possibilities to counteract the 
consolidation of such a trend, and thus 
to avoid a repetition of the trajectory that 
followed the Orange Revolution. 
It will be important to provide the sup-
port offered to Ukraine in stages. In the 
initial phase immediate aid should be sup-
plied without tough conditions in order to 
ensure a minimum of stability. But it must 
be made clear that after this short phase 
funding flows and conditions placed on 
other forms of support will be strictly 
monitored. That will protect the European 
Union from accusations of double stan-
dards. At the same time, and even more 
importantly, it will help the new ruling 
elite to develop a more responsible style of 
governing. In the medium and long term 
this contribution will be just as important 
as the financial assistance already in the 
pipeline. If Germany and the European 
Union pursue this approach they can count 
on the support of large parts of Ukrainian 
civil society, which will take a close interest 
in the activities of the new rulers. 
During the first phase clearly encourag-
ing signals should be sent not only to 
the elite but also to Ukrainian society. The 
courageous contribution of those whose 
persistent protests toppled an extremely 
corrupt regime deserves acknowledgement, 
but the positive message should be directed 
to all Ukrainian citizens. It could consist in 
offering Ukraine an explicit perspective of 
EU accession. More tangible would be visa-
free entry for short trips to the European 
Union, perhaps in the form of a temporary 
suspension of the rules laid down in the 
Visa Liberalisation Action Plan. Visa-free 
travel would apply for a limited period that 
would only be extended if the remaining 
steps required under the action plan are 
implemented. 
With respect to the Association Agree-
ment it would make sense for Ukraine to 
formulate proposals on the sequence in 
which reforms and harmonisation with EU 
standards are to occur. That would force 
key figures in the Ukrainian elite to address 
the question of priorities for the country’s 
future development. EU officials could 
monitor the process in order to ensure that 
it reflects the needs of large parts of the 
population rather than individual prefer-
ences. But the limited capacities of the 
Ukrainian administrative apparatus will 
need to be taken into consideration. Agree-
ments on priorities and capacities should 
ideally be reached before the economic part 
of the agreement is signed. Such a process 
would convey to the Ukrainian elite that it 
bears primary responsibility for implemen-
tation, and thus significantly strengthen 
its sense of ownership. That would create 
a good starting point for moving on to 
the second phase, in which the European 
Union’s monitoring and control capacities 
would have to be effectively and consistent-
ly deployed. 
In this second phase the European Union 
should cooperate closely with Ukrainian 
civil society actors from all parts of the coun-
try, who will quickly recognise if the elite 
fall back into old habits. Joining forces in 
this way will enhance the likelihood that 
real change in the political culture of the 
Ukrainian elite can be achieved. 
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